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Forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Abstract
The replication (replicability, reproducibility) crisis in social psychology and
clinical medicine arises from the fact that many apparently well-confirmed ex-
perimental results are subsequently overturned by studies that aim to replicate
the original study. The culprit is widely held to be poor science: questionable
research practices, failure to publish negative results, bad incentives, and even
fraud. In this paper I argue that the high rate of failed replications is consistent
with high quality science. We would expect this outcome if the field of science in
question produces a high proportion of false hypotheses prior to testing. If most
of the hypotheses under test are false, then there will be many false hypotheses
that are apparently supported by the outcomes of well conducted experiments
and null-hypothesis significance tests with a type-I error rate (α) of 5%. Failure
to recognize this is to commit the fallacy of ignoring the base rate. I argue that
this is a plausible diagnosis of the replication crisis and examine what lessons
we thereby learn for the future conduct of science.
1 Introduction
Psychology and clinical medical science are alleged to suffer from a crisis. In many
cases replications of scientific studies purporting to show the existence of certain
effects have failed to find those effects or have found effects only of rather smaller
size. Many scientists consequently believe that these sciences are suffering from a
crisis, and point to problems such as ‘questionable research practices’ and publica-
tion bias to explain how this crisis arose. This paper provides a different explanation
for how the replication (replicability, reproducibility) crisis came to be. I argue that
the failure of replication should not be regarded as unexpected. Rather the surprise
at the number of failed replications and consequent sense of crisis are a result of the
fallacy of neglecting the base rate.
In some sciences a high rate of false hypotheses is to be expected. It is not easy
to think up correct hypotheses, particularly in fields such as biomedicine. Basic re-
search may suggest links between possible interventions and clinical outcomes. But
our incomplete knowledge of the complex systems involved means that one cannot
have a high confidence in the correctness of a hypothetical link in advance of clinical
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trials. So, even if the experimental science that tests the hypotheses is high quality,
the high base rate of falsity will show up as a significant proportion of false positives
among all the positive results. The replication crisis is complex and polygenic—
there are several factors the contribute to it independently. Although the explana-
tion I give is not the only cause of the crisis, it is a significant one. And it is impor-
tant that it is recognized. First, because it is harmful that a failed replication should
immediately be regarded as casting aspersions on the competence and probity of
the original scientists. And secondly because it must be understood that even if
the other factors, such as poor research practices are addressed and eliminated, the
problem of irreproducible research may thereby be reduced but it will not go away.
In the light of this result, three approaches to the ‘crisis’ suggest themselves. (1)
Accept that this is the nature of these sciences at their current stage of development,
and adjust one’s credence in published results accordingly. (2) Seek means of gener-
ating research hypotheses that are more likely to be true. (3) Require that the exper-
imental research be of even higher quality, in particular by requiring a rather lower
α than the 0.05 currently regarded as acceptable.
1.1 The replication crisis
In certain fields of science, principally social psychology and clinical biomedicine,
results that seemed to show certain effects are frequently overturned by subsequent
experiments and tests that seek to replicate the original outcome. Often effects that
appeared to be firmly established are just not there or are rather weaker than first
supposed. The term ‘replication crisis’ (or ‘replicability crisis’ or ‘reproducibility cri-
sis’) is used to describe both the fact that there is this high level of failure to replicate
and the sense that these fields face a crisis as a consequence. 52% of 1,576 scientists
taking a survey conducted by the journal Nature agreed that there is a significant cri-
sis of reproducibility (Baker 2016).1 One social psychologist expresses his concerns
thus, ‘Our problems are not small and they will not be remedied by small fixes. Our
problems are systemic and they are at the core of how we conduct our science.’2
One reason for anxiety about the crisis, or about talk of a crisis, is that it might ac-
celerate the decline in public trust in science. While trust in scientists remains high
in the UK, it has fallen, according to a poll carried out in 2015, by 4% in the preced-
ing year.3 In the U.S. trust in scientists is lower than trust in the military (Funk and
Kennedy 2016). A particular worry is that the crisis of replication may fuel distrust in
science that is far removed from those areas in which the crisis arises. For example,
an article in Investor’s Business Daily entitled ‘Memo To Global Warming Alarmists:
Science Is Often Wrong’ refers to an article that discusses replication failures.4
Begley and Ellis (2012) report that scientists from Amgen, the biotech company,
tried to replicate fifty-three studies in oncology and related fields over a ten-year
1This article in the Atlantic entitled ‘Psychology’s Replication Crisis Can’t Be Wished Away’ gives a
good sense of the angst being generated and how it is reported in public. http://www.theatlantic.
com/science/archive/2016/03/psychologys-replication-crisis-cant-be-wished-away/
472272/ accessed 21 January 2017.
2Michael Inzlicht ‘Reckoning with the Past’ http://michaelinzlicht.com/getting-better/
2016/2/29/reckoning-with-the-past accessed 21 January 2017.
3https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3685/
Politicians-are-still-trusted-less-than-estate-agents-journalists-and-bankers.
aspx. Accessed 19 January 2017.
4http://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/do-not-trust-climate-science-scientists-wrong-all-the-time/
accessed 19 January 2017.
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period. Of these only six (11%) were satisfactorily replicated. Another study (Ioan-
nidis 2005a) considered all the most highly cited clinical research studies published
in three leading medical journals, and looked to see whether there were subsequent
studies of the same hypotheses that were larger or better controlled. 45 such studies
claimed an effective intervention. 16% of these were contradicted by the later stud-
ies, while in another 16% the effect was found to be smaller in the later than in the
earlier study. 44% were replicated and the results of the remaining 24% of studies
went largely unchallenged.
A number of very significant results in psychology have failed attempts at repli-
cation. One very well-known and influential result in social psychology (Bateson
et al. 2006) says that an image of a pair of eyes watching a subject will tend to in-
crease their socially co-operative behaviour, such as the amount the subject pays
into an honesty box for tea and coffee. But a larger study (Carbon and Hesslinger
2011) failed to find the same effect. Another commonplace of social psychology is
that babies are born imitators. Yet this widely accepted claim has also been sub-
jected to serious doubt by a high-quality study (Oostenbroek et al. 2016), which
found that babies were no more likely to stick out their tongues when the researcher
was sticking her tongue out than when the researcher was making some other facial
display to the baby. Various priming effects, whereby exposure to certain cues can
influence attitudes and behaviour, have also been difficult to replicate (Doyen et al.
2012; Klein et al. 2014). One interesting piece of research (Carney et al. 2010) that
has received a lot of publicity maintained that adopting high-power poses causes
increased feelings of power and tolerance to risk, alongside changes in biomark-
ers (raised testosterone and lowered cortisol). A much larger study (Ranehill et al.
2015) replicated the increased self-reported feelings of power, but did not find any
behavioural change (e.g. regarding risk-taking), nor any change in the biomarkers.
Even effects as central to psychology as ego depletion and stereotype threat have
come under suspicion as a result of failed replications (Hagger et al. 2016; Flore and
Wicherts 2015).
1.2 The base rate fallacy
The base rate fallacy occurs when making an inference regarding the probability of
some particular occurrence of a general phenomenon (e.g. whether an individual
has a disease). The fallacy arises when the reasoner focuses solely on some salient
piece of evidence regarding that occurrence while neglecting the rate at which oc-
currences of that phenomenon would occur independently of that evidence (the
base rate). This leads to erroneous conclusions when the evidence is strongly but
imperfectly correlated with the occurrence (for example, when the evidence is some
kind of test for phenomenon) and the phenomenon itself is rare. In a well-used ex-
ample, a profiling tool might scan airline passengers for appearance and behaviour
that is indicative of being a terrorist. The test might be a good test in that it is ac-
curate in 95% of cases. That is, of every 100 non-terrorists, it says that 95 are not
terrorists and 5 are terrorists, and of every 100 terrorists it says that 95 are terrorists
and 5 are not terrorists. So, if a passenger fails the test—it says he is a terrorist, what
is the chance that he is a terrorist? Certainly not 95%. The chances are in fact minis-
cule. For the number of terrorists is tiny compared to the number of ordinary air
passengers. So if a passenger fails the test it is far, far more likely that he is an inno-
cent passenger who is a victim of the 5% failure rate of the test then he is a genuine
terrorist accurately caught by the test.
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The evidence is strong that people are prone to neglect the base rate and so make
fallacious inferences, e.g. that the passenger is likely to be a terrorist. In a famous
experiment (Casscells et al. 1978) medical students at Harvard were asked to say
how likely it was that a patient (without other indications or risk factors) who tested
positive for a rare disease in fact has the disease. The students were told that the
disease is found in 1 in 1,000 patients and that the test is 95% accurate. Almost half
the students said that the probability that the patient has the disease is 95%. In fact
the probability is less than 2%—only 11 of the 60 students got this correct answer.
We can see why the right answer is approximately 2% as follows. Let π be the
probability that S has the disease, independently of the test result; and so the prob-
ability that S does not have the disease is 1−π. Let r be the accuracy of the test;
so the probability of the test yielding an inaccurate result is 1− r. We can display
the various probabilities in a table (Table 1). (Note that in this example, as in the
has disease has no disease
tests positive πr (1−π)(1− r)
tests negative π(1− r) (1−π)r
Table 1
terrorist detection case, what we have called ‘accuracy’ in fact covers two kinds of
accuracy: the probability that someone with the disease tests positive and the prob-
ability that someone without the disease tests negative. For many tests these will in
fact be different and I will differentiate them later in the discussion.)
What we want to know is:
Pr(S has the disease, given that S tests positive).
This is equal to:
Pr(S has the disease and S tests positive)
Pr(S tests positive)
.
The denominator, Pr(S tests positive), is equal to: (Pr(S has the disease and S tests
positive) + Pr(S does not have the disease and S tests positive)). So, using Table 1:
Pr(S has the disease, given that S tests positive) = πr
πr+ (1−π)(1− r) .
We can plug in the values given in the Harvard study: π = 0.001 and r = 0.95.
Which gives:
Pr(S has the disease, given that S tests positive) = 0.019 = 1.9%.
This result shows that although the test is highly accurate (95%), the probability
that a positive test correctly indicates a case of the disease is very low (<2%). The
reason for this is the fact that the disease is very rare, so a positive test is much more
likely to arise from a non-diseased case giving a false positive than from a diseased
case giving a true positive.
2 From the base rate fallacy to the replication crisis
This section connects the two preceding sections by showing how the large num-
ber of failed replications can be explained by reference to a high base rate of falsity
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among the hypotheses tested. The sense of ‘crisis’ arises, I suggest, from the fallacy
of ignoring this base rate. In what follows I assume that the scientists in question
are concerned with scientific research hypotheses that are usually causal in form.
For example, a research hypothesis may state that a new drug will bring about a re-
duction in blood pressure for a particular cohort of patients. Or it might state that
certain stimuli will cause subjects to recall a certain type of fact more quickly. Sci-
entists have standard means of testing such hypotheses. Such tests are imperfect,
in that they can produce false positives (false hypotheses that are accepted as true)
and false negatives (true hypotheses that are accepted as false). For example, hy-
potheses of these kinds will typically be tested with a randomized controlled trial
(RCT) whose results are analysed by null hypothesis significance testing (NHST),
with the significance level set at 5%. That is, patients or subjects will be randomly
allocated to a control group and an experimental group and the difference in out-
come is measured. A statistical null hypothesis is formed, stating that there is no
baseline difference in outcome between the two groups. Using NHST we calculate
the probability that we would see the observed difference in outcome (or a larger
one) if the null hypothesis is true. If that probability is less than 5%, the null hy-
pothesis is rejected. Correspondingly the research hypothesis is accepted—it will be
published as a statistically significant outcome. Setting the significance level at 5%
means that if the null hypothesis is true, then there is a 5% probability of falsely re-
jecting it. This method of hypothesis testing (RCT plus NHST plus a 5% significance
level) is only 95% accurate in this respect—it accepts a false positive rate of 5%.5
Consider the mad scientist Dr M who has many crazy ideas. He pursues wild
hypotheses, only 1 in 1,000 of which is true. (He may be influenced by Popper’s ex-
hortation to devise hypotheses that are bold.6) However, he is a responsible enough
scientist to test his hypotheses using accurate methods, properly conducted, to the
standards expected by the scientific community. For example, he may employ ran-
domized controlled trials with null hypothesis significance testing, with the signif-
icance level set at 5%. Let us assume then that his test method is 95% accurate in
declaring that a true hypothesis is true and that false hypothesis is false. Given that
a test says that one of Dr M’s theories is true, what in fact are the chances of its being
true? This case is exactly analogous to the disease case. Instead of a case of a disease
we have a true hypothesis, and instead of a test for the disease we have a test for
truth. We can conclude that the theory’s probability of bring true is only 2%.
Now consider Prof. S. She is entirely sane, but works in a new and difficult
area where there is little solid background theory or reliable results to guide her
5Some commentators assert that ‘the null hypothesis, taken literally, is always false’ (Meehl 1978: 822;
see also Cohen 1990: 1308). In which case we cannot usefully talk of the probability of falsely rejecting it.
Cohen’s example of a null hypothesis is ‘The difference in the mean scores of U.S. men and women on an
Attitude Toward the U.N. scale is zero’. Regarding such cases where we are comparing two distinct actual
groups in a population, Cohen is surely right. Matters are more contentious, however, when the study
uses an RCT (Hagen 1997; Lakens 2014). And Meehl (1990: 204) himself notes the the equivalent claim
that ‘everything correlates to some extent with everything else’ is not true for pure experimental studies
(such as an RCT). In any case, for our purposes, we need only note two things. First, that the negations
of the scientific research hypotheses, the ‘causal null hypotheses’, so to speak, that assert that there is
no causation between one factor and another, are not always false and are very frequently true. And
secondly, that using this method to test them will generate a false rejection of the scientific null and so an
incorrect acceptance of the positive research hypothesis in 5% of cases where the research hypothesis is
false (i.e. when the causal null hypothesis is true).
6‘Bold ideas, unjustified anticipations, and speculative thought, are our only means for interpreting
nature’ (Popper 1959: 280). If scientists generate ideas with this in mind one might expect a very high
background rate of falsity among new hypotheses, as Popper himself held.
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hypothesis formation. Rather she uses her scientist’s intuition or analogues with
other ideas and results to generate hypotheses that she then submits to careful
scrutiny. Let it be that 10% of the hypotheses she forms are true. And as before,
assume that her test methods are 95% accurate. We can now draw up the following
table:
hypothesis is true hypothesis is false
passes test 0.1×0.95 0.9×0.05
fails test 0.1×0.05 0.9×0.95
and calculate the probability that one of Prof. S’s hypotheses, chosen at random, is
true if the test says it is true—which is 0.68. So only two-thirds of S’s hypotheses
that are successful in passing the test for truth, are in fact true. That means that one
third of her successful theories are in fact false. The key to understanding why is
the base rate of falsity in the hypotheses she produces. Since 90% of her hypotheses
are false, a large proportion of her successes will in fact be false hypotheses that
came up with type-I errors (false positives) in the test. Now let us imagine that
other scientists come along and test S’s successes. Since a third of her successful
hypotheses are false, that falsity will mostly show up in the outcome of these other
scientists’ tests. Since about a third of S’s successful theories are not successful on
re-testing, it may look as if S is a shoddy scientist. But S is not a shoddy scientist,
in that she carries out high quality experiments that get the correct result 95% of
the time. On the other hand, she is disadvantaged by testing hypotheses that are
very likely to be false. That fact may have nothing to do with shoddy science and
everything to do with the newness or difficulty of the field in question.
While the case of Dr M is fantastical, that of Prof. S is entirely realistic. The key
assumption, that only 10% of the hypotheses tested are true is, in fact the case in
psychology, according to an analysis by Johnson et al. (2017).
The central claim of this paper is that the replication crisis can be explained is
the same way. Sterne and Davey Smith (2001) argue that when hypotheses have a
low probability of being true, significance testing can generate a high proportion of
positive test outcomes that are in fact false positives, a point noted by Wacholder
et al. (2004) and by Colhoun et al. (2003) in connection with molecular and genetic
epidemiology, and amplified in Ioannidis’s (2005b) broader claim that ‘most pub-
lished research findings are false’.7 Just as Prof. S’s science produced many false the-
ories that passed her tests, so psychology and biomedicine have produced many
false theories that seem to be correct according to the experiments carried out by
scientists in those fields. And just as the falsity of Prof. S’s many false but successful
hypotheses is revealed on re-testing, so in these fields also there is a high level of
failure to replicate the experiments supporting successful theories. The remainder
of this section articulates this proposition in more detail; the next section provides
some reason to think that it might be true.
The first adjustment to make to the base rate fallacy model of the replication
crisis is to distinguish between the two types of accuracy discussed above. First,
there is accuracy in saying that X is so when X is so. This is described as the power of
a study. Secondly there is accuracy in saying that X is not so when X is not so. While
this does not have a formal name, it is equal to what is often called the confidence
level of the study. Correspondingly, there are two kinds of inaccuracy: saying that X
7Sterne and Davey Smith (2001) also point out the analogy with false positives in screening tests.
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is not so when X is in fact so—type-II errors (or false negatives); and saying that X
is so, when in fact it isn’t so—type-I errors (false positives). The type-II error rate is
symbolised by β, and the type-I error rate by α. In summary:
type of inaccuracy error rate accuracy type of accuracy
Type-I error α 1−α confidence level
Type-II error β 1−β power
So we can now display the various probabilities in Table 2.
hypothesis is true hypothesis is false
passes test π(1−β) (1−π)α
fails test πβ (1−π)(1−α)
Table 2
The false positive report probability (FPRP) is the probability of a hypothesis be-





Pr (hypothesis is false, given that it passes the test), which is FPRP
from:
Pr (hypothesis passes the test, given that it is false), which is α.
Indeed, mistaking the two, so that one takes a high value for α to equate to a high
value for FPRP is a fallacy of probabilistic thinking of which the fallacy of neglecting
the base rate is one manifestation. The p-value fallacy is another (Goodman 1999).
If we set α= β= 0.05 and π= 0.1 as in the case of Prof. S, then we get the result,
as before, that the probability that hypothesis that passes a test is in fact false, is
about one third. As explained above, this result is the outcome of a combination of
π being low, plus α, although small, being non-negligible. We can see that as long as
the type-II error rate, β, is not close to 1, it does not have much of an effect on FPRP.
I will consider the importance of different values of β below.
On the other hand, for FPRP to be small, we need either π to be close to 1 or α to
be close to 0. And so ifπ is itself is not close to 1 but instead is close to 0, thenαneeds
to be very close to zero, i.e. negligibly small, for FPRP to be small. For example, let
us say that we want it to be the case that when we get a positive test outcome, this
is erroneous in only 5% of cases, i.e. FPRP = 0.05. As we have seen, it is fallacious to
think that setting α to be 0.05 will achieve this. What value should we give then to α
to have a FPRP of 5%? If we keep π = 0.1 and β = 0.05, then for FPRP to be 1 in 20,
the value of α must fall from 0.05 to 0.0056 (i.e. one ninth of the value we have been
working with). I return to this point in more detail below.
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3 Explaining the replication crisis: low π and non-
negligible α
The preceding section argued that if there is both (i) a low background rate of truth
among hypotheses proposed and tested and (ii) a significance level set at a value that
although small is not negligible, then we would expect a high proportion of positive
results of tests of those hypotheses to be erroneous. Hence we would expect many
replication studies to fail to reveal what the original studies seemed to show. It is
one thing to argue that low π and non-negligible α would explain the replication
crisis, but quite another to show that they actually do. To complete the proposed
explanation of the replication crisis, we need to consider whether in fact the relevant
sciences are such that they combine low π with non-negligible α.
3.1 Science with low π
This explanation for the replication crisis depends on there being a low rate of true
hypotheses among those considered sufficiently seriously to be tested. Is that plau-
sible?
It is difficult to test directly for the hypothesis of low π. A natural way to attempt
to do this would be to use repeated tests or tests of higher quality to find out what
the proportion of the hypotheses that initially tested positive are in fact true (i.e.
1−FPRP). But to do so would be to employ the model I have presented, using the
value for FPRP to calculate a value for π. That would be to beg the question as issue,
whether this model is a plausible explanation of the replication crisis.8
So we have to use indirect considerations. Why might a field have a low π for
its hypotheses? Let us start from the other end. Why might a field have a high π?
One reason is that the field is dominated by a well-established and well-confirmed
theory and the hypotheses of the field test specific aspects of this theory or appli-
cations of the theory in particular domains, or they extend the theory in plausible
ways. In such cases it is possible to have a fairly high degree of confidence that the
hypothesis is true. For example, the discovery of the Higgs boson in 2012 was the
experimental verification of a hypothesis that had first been proposed in the 1960s
and was developed in subsequent decades. That hypothesis was not a stand-alone
theory but was a component part of the Standard Model of particle physics. The
Standard Model is one of the experimentally best confirmed theories in all science,
and before its discovery, the Higgs mechanism was the one remaining unverified
part of the model. Furthermore, physicists had a clear understanding, based both in
the well-established theory and in a long-standing experimental tradition, of what
kind of experiment would detect the Higgs particle if it exists. Of course, despite
its past successes, the Standard Model might be erroneous in important respects
and the route from the Standard Model to the Higgs hypothesis was not trivial and
assumptions, albeit plausible ones, need to be made. So the outcome of the exper-
iments carried out using the Large Hadron Collider at CERN in July 2012 were not
a forgone conclusion. Nonetheless, most physicists believed that the Higgs particle
would be discovered by that research. Elsewhere in physics, the existence of grav-
itational waves, first directly confirmed in 2016, was a longstanding prediction of
8For this reason we cannot use the conclusion of Ioannidis (2005b) that most published research
findings (in biomedicine) are false since he uses similar arguments to reach that conclusion. Indeed
Goodman and Greenland (2007) accuse Ioannidis of circular reasoning.
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Einstein’s general theory of relativity. Since the latter has considerable independent
experimental support, the gravitational wave hypothesis was highly plausible. De-
signing and carrying out a suitable detection experiment was not easy. But again,
given the track record of success of general relativity, the widespread expectation
was that gravitational waves do exist and would produce the relevant outcome in a
suitable experiment.
Clinical medicine and psychology, especially social psychology, contrast with
physics in two respects. First, although our understanding of physiology and pathol-
ogy are improving rapidly, the biological systems in question are so complex that our
knowledge remains radically incomplete. And the hypotheses under consideration
in clinical medicine are not more-or-less direct consequences of those underlying
basic theories. Rather they are hypotheses concerning the action of a drug on pa-
tients, and so stand at some inferential distance from the underlying theory. So the
connection between our underlying theory and the hypothesis under test is much
weaker than in physics. Secondly, the experimental evidence for the underlying the-
ory is generally much weaker also.9
Thus in physics, we can say, first, ‘if the Standard Model is correct, then the hy-
pothesis of the Higgs mechanism is very probably true’; and, secondly, ‘there is very
strong evidence that the Standard Model is correct’. Together these imply that it is
probable that Higgs hypothesis is correct. Consider, by contrast, the trials of the drug
Bapineuzumab, a proposed treatment for Alzheimer’s disease. Here the underlying
basic theory is that beta-amyloid (Aβ) plaques that are characteristic of Alzheimer’s
play a causal role in the pathology of the disease and cause the cognitive impairment
that is symptomatic of it. This is the amyloid cascade hypothesis. Bapineuzumab is
an antibody to those plaques, and hence it was hoped that the drug would inhibit
and reduce the Aβ plaques and so the symptoms of Alzheimer’s. That it would do
so is the target hypothesis tested in two major trials in 2012. However, in this case,
the underlying theory, the amyloid cascade hypothesis, though supported by evi-
dence is not undisputed. Some researchers hold that so-called ‘tangles’ (collapse of
the τ proteins) are an equally or more significant causal factor. The relationship be-
tween the Aβ plaques, the tangles, and the cognitive effects of Alzheimer’s disease
are far from being fully understood. So the theory underlying the hypothesis that
Bapineuzumab would be an effective intervention for Alzheimer’s is both incom-
plete and subject to doubt. Hence the best one can say in this case is first, ‘if the
amyloid cascade hypothesis is correct, it is possible that reduction in plaques will
halt or reverse Alzheimer’s, and so conceivable that an antibody to the plaques will
assist Alzheimer’s sufferers’; and, secondly, ‘the amyloid cascade hypothesis may be
correct, but the evidence is far from conclusive’. Consequently, the hypothesis that
Bapineuzumab would be an effective treatment for Alzheimer’s was at best a reason-
able hope; it was hardly a hypothesis that anyone should have expected to be true.
In summary, mechanistic reasoning is very helpful in medicine, but it often fails to
support a high probability (high π) for its hypotheses. Analogous comments may
be made about psychology and social psychology where there is little in the way of
a complete and well-evidenced underlying theory from which hypotheses can be
derived with confidence. In medicine there are additional reasons for a low π. As
Begley and Ellis (2012) explain, ‘Given the high unmet need in oncology, it is under-
9There are other reasons why one science might have a lower π than another, some of which I con-
sider below. One difference, pointed out to me by an anonymous referee, is that some fields have a well-
established practice of circulating preprints, working papers, and the like. This may help eliminate errors
or implausible hypotheses before formal publication or even before experiments are conducted.
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standable that barriers to clinical development may be lower than for other disease
areas, and a larger number of drugs with suboptimal preclinical validation will en-
ter oncology trials.’ Such a motivation—alongside a financial one—was no doubt
at work in trialling Bapineuzumab before the basic science ruled out the tangle hy-
pothesis.
Other areas in non-clinical biomedicine benefit from the fact that it is easy
to generate and test new hypotheses. Genetic and molecular epidemiology seeks
causal linkages between genetic variants and disease, in particular in connection
with environmental factors. As Wacholder et al. (2004) explain, when it was not fea-
sible to study multiple genes in a pathway, let alone an entire genome, studies were
directed at particularly promising hypotheses, prompted by strong biological evi-
dence; whereas advances in technology have now made it much easier and cheaper
to test for possible relationships between variants in genes (whose function may not
be known) and disease. Given the large number of possible relationships, but the
rather smaller number of true relationships, it is to be expected that many of the
hypotheses tested will be false.10
Hypotheses in clinical medicine and in psychology, as well as in other sciences,
may come from sources other than a basic theory. Hypotheses may be suggested by
the results of observational studies or even by unsystematic observations or the re-
searcher’s intuition. These are perfectly legitimate means of generating hypotheses.
On the other hand, they are not means of generating hypotheses that give those hy-
potheses a high probability of truth. Indeed, some sources seem clearly liable to pro-
duce false hypotheses. For example, psychologists have been investigating whether
subjects who acted out the literal meaning of a metaphor would demonstrate the
behavioural dispositions associated with their metaphorical meaning. In one study
(Leung et al. 2012) subjects working inside a box-like room were compared with sub-
jects working outside of the room with regard to their creativity to see whether lit-
erally ‘thinking outside the box’ can boost creativity. In another study, researchers
(Sanna et al. 2011) investigated whether subjects in a physically more elevated po-
sition (occupying the ‘moral high ground’) were more likely to engage in pro-social
behaviour (exhibiting ‘higher virtues’). It is perfectly legitimate to investigate such
ideas. But they are clearly not hypotheses in which one should have had high con-
fidence ahead of testing. Consequently, although the some such experiments pro-
duce positive results, it should not be a very great surprise that subsequent attempts
at replication do not.
A common motivation or inspiration for a new hypothesis is an analogy with
other previously confirmed hypotheses (Dunbar 1996; Blanchette and Dunbar
2000).11 For example, the power-pose study (Carney et al. 2010) referred to above
does not cite any underlying theory from which the hypothesis is derived. Rather
the authors refer to two sets of research findings. First, they point out that power
is expressed through physical displays, a commonplace observation confirmed by
research. Secondly, they refer to research on embodied cognition, saying, ‘some re-
search suggests that bodily movements, such as facial displays, can affect emotional
states. For example, unobtrusive contraction of the “smile muscle” (i.e. the zygo-
maticus major) increases enjoyment (Strack, Martin, Stepper, 1988), 88), the head
10Ioannidis (2005b: 699) gives an example concerning genetic determinants of schizophrenia.
11Thomas Kuhn (1970) argued that the key element in his notion of a‘paradigm’ is what he called an
‘exemplar’—an exemplary solution to a scientific problem that become a model for subsequent research.
In his view normal science is driven by modelling research problems and their solutions on such exem-
plars.
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tilting upward induces pride (Stepper and Strack, 1993) etc.’ On the basis of these
findings the researchers hypothesised that adopting high-power poses would cause
increased feelings of power and tolerance to risk. Again, given such background in-
formation, it is reasonable to suppose that there might be such an effect. But that
information certainly does not make it likely that there is such an effect.
There is a further problem when a false positive result itself becomes an exem-
plar upon which further research hypotheses are based. Some of the supposed ef-
fects that have failed to replicate, such as social priming, are sufficiently accepted
and important that new research hypotheses are suggested by analogy with them.
With many false positive results, the practice of modelling new hypotheses on analo-
gies and parallels with old results will itself lead to those new hypotheses being
false in most cases. And this may well explain the problem with the power-pose
hypothesis. For it also turns out that the finding that smiling increases enjoyment,
upon which the power-pose hypothesis was explicitly based, has itself failed tests of
replication (Wagenmakers et al. 2016). What we may call the falsity feedback effect,
whereby a study with a false positive becomes an exemplar (model) for subsequent
hypotheses, will clearly encourage a higher base rate of falsity among hypotheses.
3.2 The value of α—type-I errors
For very many studies in the fields we are considering α is set as 0.05, the value we
have been using above. That is because what counts as passing the experimental
test is that it should produce a p-value of less than 0.05. When an experimental test
is carried out, the observed value of some parameter of interest may differ between
the experimental arm of the experiment and the control arm, in a way that is qualita-
tively in line with the hypothesis. Some such difference may come about by random
error, even if the hypothesis is false. When the data is analysed, its p-value is calcu-
lated. This is the probability of obtaining a difference between the two group at least
as great as that observed, if the null hypothesis is true (i.e. if the hypothesis under
test is false). This is null hypothesis significance testing. In defining success as a
p-value as less than 0.05, we are saying that the chances of a successful (i.e. positive)
result given that the hypothesis is false is 0.05. We are setting success at a level such
that type-I errors occur in 5% of false hypotheses tested.
It is notable that this threshold is far less stringent than that used in some other
sciences, most obviously physics. When the Higgs boson was discovered, the data
met the widely accepted ‘five sigma’ (5σ) standard. Hereσ is one standard deviation
from the mean. So 5σ refers to an outcome that is five standard deviations (or more)
from the expected mean value, should the null hypothesis be true. That is equivalent
to anα of 0.00003%, i.e. we would expect to get this positive result (or more extreme)
from a false hypothesis on, roughly, one occasion in every 3 million tests. The prin-
cipal reason for physics using this standard is the quantity of data produced by the
experiments in particle physics. This has two consequences. First, it is possible to
produce data that meets this standard, whereas in medicine and psychology is just
is not feasible to have enough patients or subjects to generate data of that quality.
Secondly, it is necessary to have data that meets this high standard, in order to avoid
false positives. This is because scientists use the data from experiments to look for
patterns—so-called ‘bumps’ in the data—that may be suggestive of hitherto unsus-
pected effects. However, given the large quantity of data from a noisy environment,
one can expect this kind of data-trawling to generate false positives—false hypothe-
ses arising from statistical blips. So a correspondingly stringent standard of discov-
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ery is required. For example, several bumps were detected by Fermilab’s Tevatron
collider that were significant at the 3σ level and which subsequently disappeared
when more data was acquired. Physicists thus typically regard data at the 3σ level as
‘evidence’ of an effect (e.g. a new particle) while 5σ is required for ‘discovery’. In ef-
fect, the physicists are acknowledging the claim made in this paper: if you use a low
quality means of generating hypotheses (a means that generates a high background
rate of falsity), then you need a correspondingly high standard of statistical signifi-
cance (i.e. a very lowα). Additionally, the external pressures are different for physics
from medicine. The huge cost of the particle accelerators in physics means that the
physicists running them have strong reason to avoid retracting announcements of
discoveries. Whereas in medicine there is economic pressure on drug companies to
produce results, as well a moral pressure to find cures.
4 Other explanations of the crisis
The Nature survey reported that 60% of respondents held that pressure to publish
and selective reporting played a major part in the crisis surrounding failed replica-
tions. More than 50% referred to insufficient replication in the lab, poor oversight,
or low statistical power. None pointed to the two factors identified in this paper: low
π and too high a value for α.
4.1 Low statistical power
Some commentators have associated the replication crisis with the low statistical
power of many studies in the relevant fields. Statistical power is the converse of β,
the type-II error rate. It is one of the two kinds of accuracy considered above, 1−β
(the other being 1−α).
Button et al. (2013) provide an analysis to support this claim. They focus on the
Positive Predictive Value (PPV) of a positive outcome in a test or experiment: the
probability that a hypothesis is in fact true, given that it yields a positive outcome.
This is the number 1−FPRP I mentioned above. We can see straightforwardly that:
PPV = 1−FPRP = π(1−β)
(1−π)α+π(1−β) .
And this number increases as β decreases, and so in order to maximise PPV we
should aim to reduce β, the type-II error rate, or, equivalently, increase the power
of the study, 1−β.12
I do not find this analysis entirely satisfactory either as an explanation of the
replication crisis or as a solution. Note first that the problem does not disappear
if we require all the studies to have a very high power. In the example of Prof. S
we assumed an accuracy of 95% with regard to both type-I and type-II errors; i.e.
α = β = 0.05. That is a very high power and would be unusual in the areas of re-
search we are discussing.13 It is rather higher than the 80% typically thought to be
satisfactory. Nonetheless, Q’s PPV is only 68%—almost a third of her positive results
are false. With her π of 0.1 and α set at the conventional 0.05, even maximum power
12The analysis from Button et al. (2013) is slightly different in that they use the pre-study odds of the
hypothesis being true, whereas I have used the π probability of its being true. These are mathematically
related so their analysis is mathematically identical to that given in this section.
13I have used this unusually high value in order to isolate the contribution of a non-negligible α.
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(100%) will increase her PPV only by 1% to 69%. For that matter, if her power were
lowered to 80%, then her PPV is still 64%. And lowering her power to the rather fee-
ble 50%, lowers her PPV only to 53%. Thus a power change from a low 50% up to an
impossibly perfect 100% raises S’s PPV from 53% to 68%. Thus a change in power, in
this case, makes only a marginal difference to PPV.
Figure 1: PPV (y-axis) as a function of power (x-axis) whenπ = 0.1 andα = 0.05). Even
with maximum power, almost a third of positive results will be false positives.
The positive experimental results in a field are a combination of the false pos-
itives and the true positives. So we have a high chance of a positive result being a
false positive when the former are numerous and the latter are rare. It is therefore
correct that PPV will improve when we increase the number of true positives. But in
a context where there is a high number of false positives, this seems to be focussing
in the wrong place. What we really need to be doing is to reduce the false posi-
tives. Think of the example of terrorist detection device. In that case what makes the
device impractical is the large number of innocent travellers that are falsely iden-
tified as terrorists. The overall proportion of terrorists among the positives will be
increased if we raise its type-II accuracy from 95% to 100%. But by only a very little
and not by enough to render the device useful.
I do note, however, that if power is already rather lower than I have supposed,
say around 0.2, then the benefit to PPV of increasing power will be greater, because
the gradient of the curve in Fig. 1 is steeper for low power. So where in fact do the
sciences in question find themselves on the curve in Fig. 1? There is recent evi-
dence that in some fields power is low, as low as 0.2 for small effect sizes, in cogni-
tive neuroscience and psychology (Szucs and Ioannidis 2017) and some subfields of
biomedicine (but not others) (Dumas-Mallet et al. 2017). The principal cause of low
power is small sample size (small effect size is another important factor). Dumas-
Mallet et al. (2017) excluded studies that concerned treatments of disease (and also
screening and diagnosis)—which are studies that would typically have large sample
sizes. So for some fields it does appear that low power is a problem, and this does
reduce PPV because there are even fewer true positives to counteract the false posi-
tives generate by non-negligibleα. So increasing power, say from 0.2 to the accepted
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standard of 0.8, will increase PPV from about one third to two-thirds (for α = 0.05
and π = 0.1). But, as argued above, reducing the remaining third (i.e. getting PPV
above 0.68) cannot be achieved by any amount of increase in power, but only by
reducing α, as Fig. 2 shows, or by increasing π.
There are three other respects in which raising power has some benefits, other
than by directly increasing PPV. First, and most importantly, we should want the
replication tests themselves to be highly powered. Direct replications will often just
mirror the original experiment along with its power calculations, which may in any
case overestimate the experiment’s true power. A low powered replication may fail
to reveal a true effect. So in some cases we might mistakenly believe that original
hypothesis and its supporting experiment have failed a test of replication, but in
fact they are correct and it is the replication that is in error. Note that this error is a
type-II error and so power is directly relevant. We should want to increase the power
of our replications so that we can be sure that a failure to replicate really is a problem
for the original hypothesis and experiment.
Secondly, when it comes to minimizing the falsity feedback effect it will help to
have a higher proportion of the positives being true positives, even if that does not
come from reducing the absolute number of false positives. Given limited resources
for carrying out future research, it will be better for science if a larger proportion
of new hypotheses are modelled on true exemplars, thus increasing π for those hy-
potheses.
Finally, increasing power will be achieved by increasing the sample size. That
in turn means that it will be possible to decrease α while still being able to detect
worthwhile effects. That depends on our being willing to reduce α, the choice of
which is a matter of convention. If one increases power without reducingα then our
experiments will simply reveal more positives where the effect size is small. This may
be tempting. But it makes no difference to the analysis just given. It will remain the
case that many of the newly detected apparent ‘effects’ are mere statistical artefacts.
I return to this below.
To summarize. I have used an implausibly high power of 95% in order to isolate
the effect of α set at 0.05, when π = 0.1. Even power of an impossible 100% leaves
an FPRP (the false positive report rate) of 31%. So improving power would still leave
a big problem. It is true that when we give more realistic values for power, say 50%,
then the problem becomes even worse, with an FPRP of 47%. Still, most of this 47%
is account for by the value of α. (For very low powered studies, the influence of low
power on the FPRP does become more significant.) Increasing power of studies in
fields where power is often low is certainly valuable. But it is no panacea.
4.2 Publication bias
Publication bias is any kind of bias where the details of the results of a trial affect
whether it is published (independently of other factors in the research, such as qual-
ity). The principal form of publication bias is a tendency to publish positive out-
comes, i.e. those that show a statistically significant outcome, more than studies
with negative results. Such bias can be exercised by the journal (which declines to
publish negative results) or by the researcher (who declines to submit them—the so-
celled ‘file-drawer problem’ (Rosenthal 1979)). This is the form of publication bias
that I will assume is at work, as evidence suggests it is in biomedical research and in
psychology (Ross et al. 2012). Publication bias has been cited as one source of the
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replication crisis (cf. Pashler and Wagenmakers 2012; Francis 2012; Ferguson and
Heene 2012; Romero 2016),
Publication bias on its own cannot be an explanation of the replication crisis.
Imagine circumstances where there is strong publication bias at work—only posi-
tive results get published. But the scientists and journals also apply very high stan-
dards of quality and set a high bar for statistical significance. And let’s say also that
hypotheses are tested only when they have solid theoretical backing. Since a pow-
erful filter for eliminating false hypotheses is being applied, it will be the case that
when one sees a report of a positive result, that positive result is very likely to be
true. There will few false positives, hence few failed replications. On the other hand,
when one formulates a hypothesis on which there is no published information, one
will not know whether that is because the hypothesis has been tested and found un-
proven or false (an unpublished negative result) or because the hypothesis has not
been tested. One’s ignorance in the latter case, does not, however, undermine one’s
knowledge in the positive case.
So publication bias cannot explain the replication crisis because it cannot ex-
plain why there are any false positive results. And without false positives there can be
no crisis. But publication bias can exacerbate the crisis. If there is a non-negligible
chance of a false positive result being published, then it will be important that nega-
tive results on the same topic also get published. If negative outcomes are published,
then the community is less likely to accept the positive result as proven, because, for
example, a meta-analysis shows that when all the available evidence is pooled, the
effect is not statistically significant. Publication bias renders meta-analysis less re-
liable (Colhoun et al. 2003; Ferguson and Heene 2012).14 Or if the negative result is
published first, then in order to claim a positive outcome subsequent researchers
will need to carry out trials of greater size. That very fact will itself mean that the
publication of a false positive is reduced. Conversely, bias preventing the publica-
tion of negative results will make it more likely that false positives will be accepted
as true.
Publication bias is a serious problem for science, one which the AllTrials initia-
tive is attempting to address. It does contribute to the replication crisis, but only
marginally. The problem with the replication crisis is the publication of erroneous
studies, not the non-publication of correct studies.
4.3 Bias, questionable research practices, and fraud
A large part of the sense that there is a crisis in some parts of science is the con-
cern that the best explanation of the many replication failures is that many scien-
tists are carrying out badly managed experiments that allow for unconscious bias,
or are using self-serving analytic techniques such as p-hacking, or are even engag-
ing in conscious fraud.15 The culture of ‘publish or perish’ is widely blamed for poor
standards and practices (John et al. 2012; Simmons et al. 2011)—‘questionable re-
search practices’ as they have become known—along with journal editors’ biases
towards positive over negative results (see above) and in favour of papers meeting
inappropriate aesthetic standards (Giner-Sorolla 2012). There are powerful incen-
14Though, as Romero (2016: 65) points out, if the null hypothesis is true, then in the long run pub-
lished positive results in one direction should be cancelled out by positive results in the opposite direc-
tion.
15p-hacking occurs when researchers have collected data on many variables, look for correlations in
the data for which p < 0.05, and then report these as statistically significant.
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tives for researchers to produce interesting positive results and so it would be no
surprise that some researchers cut corners, leading to outcomes that cannot later
be replicated (Romero 2017) as well as disincentivizing replication itself.
There is no doubt that there are cases of this kind. Most notoriously, the so-
cial psychologist Diederik Stapel was found by Tilburg University to have committed
fraud on a huge scale in the first decade of this century, leading to the retraction of
over fifty publications in social psychology. The report produced by Tilburg Univer-
sity argued that the scientific community had also itself failed in that it was insuffi-
ciently critical and too ready to accept results that confirmed researchers’ intuitions
and expectations.16 Stapel is at one extreme. But it is easy to see how others might
unconsciously allow themselves to bias their experiments (as is shown, ironically, by
many results in cognitive and social psychology).
That some false positives are to be explained in this way is clear. But what pro-
portion? To answer that reliably would require a careful examination of studies that
have failed replication attempts, looking for signs of bias, poor research practices,
and fraud. There is some evidence on this, but not enough yet to draw a clear con-
clusion. It may be that there are differences in this respect between different fields.
Research teams in social psychology tend to be rather smaller than those engaged
in biomedical research and for that reason it would be easier for poor practice to
go unchallenged and unchecked in the former than in the latter. It is not possible
to draw a definitive conclusion in comparing the poor practice explanation of the
‘crisis’ with the one I have presented. However, the plausibility of the explanation
presented in this paper does mean that we should be circumspect before resorting
to moral panic. There is another explanation of the replication crisis that is con-
sistent with experiments being carried out to impeccable standards. With low π and
non-negligibleα even excellent scientific practice will yield many false positives and
hence many failed replications.
I note, however, that accepting α as high as 5% might be regarded as a question-
able research practice of the community as a whole. The research community, and
its most successful practitioners in particular, benefit from a relatively high α. They
are incentivized to publish. A lower α would required larger sample sizes and that
means more expensive experiments. Which in turn means fewer experiments and
so fewer publications. And so successful scientists in these fields have no reason to
pursue greater PPV.
5 What is to be done?
In the light of the forgoing how should science respond to the replication crisis?
There are three possibilities. (1) Do nothing—this is the nature of these sciences
at their current stage of development. (2) Seek means of generating research hy-
potheses that are more likely to be true. (3) Require that the experimental research
be of even higher quality, in particular by requiring a rather lower α than the 0.05
currently regarded as acceptable.
5.1 Quietism—this is the nature of science
The quietist approach, (1), proposes that we should just accept that it is in the nature
of science that we get things wrong, and that this is particularly true with sciences in
16A plausible conclusion but one that has been challenged by social psychologists.
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early stages of development. Popper (1963), for example, urged scientists to formu-
late bold hypotheses. But bold hypotheses are likely to be false. So we should, like
Popper himself, expect to find that our hypotheses, although they may pass some
tests, will be falsified in due course.17 Thus a corollary of the quietist position is that
one should have a corresponding lowered credence even in hypotheses that have
passed the tests that we have set them. That in turn should influence how think of
new hypotheses. In the light of the falsity feedback effect, one should be wary of
placing too much prior confidence in new hypotheses that are modelled on other,
apparently successful hypotheses. The quietist must accept that the difference be-
tween passing and failing a single test does not correlate that closely with the differ-
ence between truth and falsity. Consequently the quietist should value replication
studies much more than they are currently valued in many areas of science. Klein
(2014: 327), for example, reports that the Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy does not publish replication studies as a mater of policy, even when the replica-
tion concerns an alleged finding of considerable significance.18 The quietist should
deplore this.
Quietism may be a reasonable stance to take in social psychology. The quietist
may hope that in due course certain results will indeed stand out as reliable (thanks
to successful replications) and that a stronger science may crystallize around these.
And that may assist the development of a strong theory in the field. Matters may be
thought to be different in clinical medicine. For here it is important that we know
which hypotheses about the effectiveness of an intervention are true and which are
false. If a false hypothesis passes a conventionally accepted test (e.g. a phase III
randomized controlled trial with a 95% confidence interval), then that may initiate
the use of that intervention (subject to various regulatory conditions). Not only will
the intervention (e.g. a new drug) fail to do good, it will do harm. Most treatments
have harmful side-effects that are acceptable only because they are outweighed by
the supposed benefits. Furthermore, use of one treatment will often preclude or dis-
place the use of another treatment. So a patient who takes a new drug that although
ineffective has achieved a positive result in an RCT may thereby be missing out on a
treatment that really is effective (even if at a level lower than that falsely claimed for
the new drug). And belief that this treatment is effective will discourage investment
in developing further new treatments.19
5.2 Higher quality hypotheses
The second approach advocates trying to generate hypotheses with a greater prob-
ability of truth. This is, of course, rather easier said than done. In medicine this
amounts to reaffirming the importance of basic research. It may also encourage
the continuation of basic research beyond the point when a new therapeutic idea
becomes plausible. Rather than moving straight to a trial, as in the case of Bap-
ineuzumab, further basic research may be a better use of resources, so that hypoth-
esized mechanisms of action can be better confirmed before being used to gener-
17Popper’s reasons for scepticism are, however, not those discussed in this paper, but lie instead in his
rejection of induction.
18For example, that journal’s editor declined to publish replications (with null results) (Ritchie et al.
2012) of Bem’s (2011) findings concerning precognition.
19The point about the pragmatic implications of quietism does have some relevance to social psy-
chology too, since many of its results have been used in devising policy or in the business of professional
development and training personnel.
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ate or support a proposal regarding an intervention. In some cases greater use of
observational data may be used to supplement mechanistic hypotheses. In social
psychology matters are different. Here the problem is not so much an incomplete
basic theory, but lack of any basic theory at all; and the prospect of one capable of
generating high quality hypotheses is some way off. In any case the route to that
theory will most likely be via the collection first of a set of reliable results of the gen-
eral kind that social psychology is currently trying to produce. So it will be difficult
directly to improve the quality of hypotheses in social psychology. However, it might
be that over time a greater proportion of the accepted hypotheses are true, as repli-
cation weeds out the false positives and more stringent tests (see below) prevent
them from arising in the first place. That being the case the falsity feedback effect
with be increasingly dominated by a truth feedback effect, as the models for new
hypotheses are increasingly true positives rather than false positives.
5.3 Decrease α
The third solution suggested by my analysis is that we should demand higher con-
fidence levels before we accept a result in these fields. That a result is regarded as
statistically significant when its p-value is less than 0.05 is a convention, one widely
adopted in medicine and psychology, but not in other sciences.20 Earlier I men-
tioned that physics requires outcomes that are more than 5σ from the mean before
a null hypotheses is definitively rejected, whereas in biomedicine and social psy-
chology 1.96σ is the norm. (1.96σ is equivalent to a confidence interval of 95% in
a two-tailed test.) A 95% confidence interval looks good, but, as our discussion of
the the base rate fallacy makes clear, a 95% confidence interval does not lead to a
probability of 95% that a hypothesis is true given that is passes the test. To make
that inference is to commit the p-value fallacy. To get a PPV of 95%, when π = 0.1, we
would need to reduceα to almost 0.005 (to increase our confidence level to 2.85σ, to
be precise). As opposed to increasing power alone, decreasing α does, in principle,
allow us to increase PPV to any desired value (see Fig. 2).
Others have also called for lower α. Johnson (2013) and Benjamin et al. (2018)
suggest that p-values should be below 0.005 before a result is accepted as statisti-
cally significant.21 One of the motivations for Benjamin et al. is that this change
would help address the replication crisis. Others resist such a move for various rea-
sons. Crane (2017), for example, asserts ‘P-hacking and the reproducibility crisis:
like smoking and lung cancer, one cannot be discussed without the other’ and so
Benjamin et al. fail to address the central issue of the crisis. But that assertion de-
pends on assuming that the central cause of the crisis is the prevalence of question-
able research practices. While p-hacking and the like contribute to the problem,
this analysis suggest that we cannot safely assume that poor practice is the principle
contributor. Wacholder et al. (2004) criticize a similar proposal from Colhoun et al.
(2003) for lowering α, saying ‘We consider setting a low α level to be an indirect and
inferior means to achieve the desired end of a low FPRP, because an FPRP can be
high even for a low observed P value when the prior probability is low. Moreover,
20It is unclear why the 5% significance level is regarded as appropriate. We find it first clearly stated
in Fisher, but its origins go back further (Cowles and Davis 1982). I suspect that it is widely accepted
because a one-in-twenty occurrence sounds rare enough. But, as discussed, it is a fallacy to assume that
this means that one on in twenty positive results are erroneous.
21Yet others call for the abandonment of null hypothesis significance testing altogether (McShane
et al. 2017 for example). Bayesians in particular propose alternatives (Masson 2011 for example).
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Figure 2: PPV (y-axis) as a function of power (x-axis) whenπ = 0.1, for different values
of α.
insisting on a very low P value before any finding is considered statistically signifi-
cant may unnecessarily reduce statistical power when the prior probability is high,
thereby constraining research on diseases with rare genetic variants or on diseases
for which studies with large sample sizes are unrealistic.’ However, what these com-
ments show is that there is no single α value that is appropriate for all fields. We
have seen that physics works with very low α indeed. For research on carefully tar-
geted hypotheses that are backed by strong biological rationale, then the α = 0.05
standard may remain appropriate. The point about orphan diseases is an impor-
tant one. If there are too few patients to support research with a very low α (see
below), then it will be necessary to ensure that only those hypotheses are tested that
are well-motivated by strong underlying theory. But if that is not possible either,
then we have to accept that the results of some such research will remain tentative.
Benjamin et al. (2018) propose that results with 0.005 < p < 0.05 should be called
‘suggestive’.
It is true that one consequence of this proposal is that trials need to be much
larger if they are to detect the same effects while being statistically significant at
lower significance levels, such as at the 0.5% level (α = 0.005). That will likely be too
demanding for psychology. It may not be quite such an obstacle in clinical medicine
where quite large trials are already common. A current advantage of large trials for
pharmaceutical companies is that they are able to detect very small effects that are
statistically significant at the standard 5% level. Reducing α would mean that many
of these results are no longer counted as statistically significant. That itself may,
paradoxically, be a benefit, since many such small effects, while statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level are not clinically significant. For example, Bhardwaj et al. (2004)
discuss a large trial (2209 patients) of penciclovir, a topical treatment for herpes labi-
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alis (cold sores). There was a median reduction in time to healing of lesions from 5.5
days in the placebo group to 4.8 days in the treatment group. This was statistically
significant at the 1% level (p < 0.001). But as Bhardwaj et al. report, ‘the results of
this study, while statistically significant, lack much clinical relevance. . . . This study,
by using a very large sample size, detected a difference so small that it is probably
not of much clinical benefit to patients.’ That is, while a reduction in α will lose
many false positive results it will also lose some true positive results, but these will
often be results of limited or no clinical relevance. The demand for more stringent
statistical standards and so for larger trials may mean that there will be fewer tri-
als. Again, that need not be a disadvantage in the context of a large number of false
positives. Fewer trials will mean that resources are directed towards testing those
hypotheses with the best chances of producing a positive result (i.e. those thought
most likely to be true) rather than trials that are little better than fishing expeditions.
That in turn will itself improve the PPV.
6 Conclusion
Let us return to a case such as that discussed in the Harvard medical school study.
Consider a subject S who assumes that a test for some disease is highly reliable—it is
95% accurate. S then unwittingly falls victim to the base rate fallacy and so expects
19 out of 20 people with a positive test result to be suffering from the disease. S
then discovers that when retested the majority of those who had a positive test result
now come back with a negative result. S is now likely to think she make a mistaken
assumption—the test was not as reliable as she had assumed. In fact it seems to be
downright unreliable. S may lose faith in that test and perhaps begin to doubt other
aspects of modern medicine. But that would not be the correct conclusion to draw,
as we have seen. Things only look that way because S committed the fallacy of base
rate neglect.
This paper has argued that we can explain the replication crisis and the scien-
tific community’s concern about it in the same way. By focussing on an α value of
0.05 we think we ought to be able to have a high level of confidence that a hypoth-
esis is true, if it is confirmed by a properly conducted study will be true. On sub-
sequently finding grounds, such as failure to replicate, for holding that many such
hypotheses are false, we are inclined to think that the original studies were not prop-
erly conducted. The belief that many studies in psychology or clinical medicine are
not properly conducted takes us a long way towards a crisis of confidence in those
sciences. This paper argues that this is fallacious reasoning. To say this is not to
deny that questionable research practices have contributed to the existence of false
positives, or that the incentive structures of science can sometimes act against the
search for truth and replicable findings (Nosek et al. 2012; Higginson and Munafò
2016; Romero 2016, 2017; Christian 2017). These are undoubtedly real problems for
science. Nonetheless, the human tendency to attribute intention, malfeasance, and
defect of character where we see harm (Jones and Harris 1967; Ross 1977; Harman
1999; Knobe and Burra 2006), such as publishing unreproducible findings, may lead
us to overestimate their significance. It is important to be aware that even well-
performed research can be quite likely to produce a false positive result. Recogniz-
ing this might reduce the acrimony and tension that surrounds failed replication.
The analysis I have given lends itself very naturally to a Bayesian treatment (cf.
Colhoun et al. 2003: 869, Wacholder et al. 2004: 439). I do not pursue the details
20
here because it is clear that the conclusions are exactly the same. In passing I note
the following. First, what we have called π here is the frequency with which a means
of generating hypotheses generates true hypotheses. It could be interpreted as a
credence, a degree of belief. If that degree of belief is determined by the track record
of hypotheses in the field, as the objective Bayesian would recommend (Williamson
2010), then the Bayesian analysis agrees with that given here. Secondly, it is impor-
tant to note that the frequentist is entitled to consider the source of the hypothesis
(and so the value of π) in deciding how the evidence bears on a hypothesis; the fre-
quentist is not obliged to reject the null hypothesis is the p-value obtained from an
experiment is less than 0.05. Fisher (1934: 3) himself refers to ‘the salutary habit of
repeating important experiments, or of carrying out original observations in repli-
cate’ Fisher emphasized the benefit of replicating experiments to increase the con-
fidence we have in an outcome, stating that ‘The confidence to be placed in a result
depends not only on the magnitude of the mean value obtained, but equally on the
agreement between parallel experiments’ (1934: 123).22
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